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‘Trust is good, control is better’: The 1974 Herstatt Bank Crisis and its
Implications for International Regulatory Reform
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol*
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
With its international supervisory and regulatory implications, the failure of Bankhaus
Herstatt is one of the landmarks of post-war financial history. This article offers the first
comprehensive historical account of the Herstatt crisis, and contributes to the wider
discussions on international supervisory and regulatory reform since the mid-1970s,
including regulatory capture, markets’ self-regulation and resolution of failed banks.
In doing so, it first argues that contrary to a widely held view, the German authorities
received early and repeated warnings about Herstatt’s dealings but this involved only
limited and ineffective regulatory/supervisory responses, then it turns to the actual
collapse of the bank in June 1974, and finally explores the wider regulatory issues
raised by the Herstatt case.
Keywords: Herstatt; internationalisation; regulation; supervision; management;
banking history; bank failure; resolution; reputation; Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS); foreign exchange; Bundesbank; Bundesaufsichtsamt fu¨r das
Kreditwesen
1. Introduction
A central issue of current debates about the causes of the 2008 financial crisis,
international financial regulation and supervision has raised considerable scholarly
interest. Much attention has been directed to the emergence of an international framework
for financial oversight from the 1970s, and in particular the creation of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1975 and the subsequent Basel accords.1
A number of bank failures that spurred fear in international financial markets over the
summer of 1974 indeed called for a greater degree of international coordination. Franklin
National Bank, the Israeli British Bank (IBB) and the Lloyds Lugano crisis all affected, to
different extents, markets that were already shaken by earlier problems, such as the British
secondary banking crisis of 1973.2 The above-mentioned cases all raised significant
questions as to who would regulate and supervise what and where.
Among these banking crises, the 1974 Herstatt Bank failure is traditionally considered
as one of the most important. It is often said, for instance, that Herstatt’s collapse led to the
creation of the BCBS.3 In addition to its institutional implications, the Herstatt failure is
also an important case study providing an illustration of the consequences of a poor
performance of the regulators as well as of market self-regulation, highlighting the
importance and limits of reputation in banking, and finally sketching the implications of a
bank failure with the creation of the Liko-Bank. Following risky foreign exchange
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operations in 1973 and early 1974, the German supervisory office, the Bundesaufsicht-
samts fu¨r das Kreditwesen (BAKred), decided to close the bank on 26 June 1974. But the
closure happened at the end of the working day in Frankfurt, which was in the morning of a
working day in New York, thereby leaving a number of operations unfinished. This gave
birth to the so-called Herstatt risk, that is, the risk taken by making operations across
different time-zones. The Herstatt Bank failure is not just a page of distant history. Still in
2008, the leading German economic newspaper Handelsblatt published an article on the
surviving of the Herstatt risk – and in 2004, the story was even turned into a theatre play,
Ko¨lner Devisen!4
With its international supervisory and regulatory implications, the failure of Herstatt
became one of the landmarks of the 1974 international banking crisis. Yet the literature
focusing on this case study is comparatively patchy. The German weekly Der Spiegel
conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the Herstatt failure in early 1975 based on
interviews with participants and legal documents released subsequently.5 Many authors
refer to the Herstatt case, but it usually amounts to a brief summary of the collapse, with
little attention to how the crisis actually unfolded.6 Christoph Kaserer analysed the
Herstatt crisis mostly looking at deposit insurance.7 No archive-based account exists to
date. True, a detailed archival research on the Herstatt case is rendered difficult by the
closure of the BAKred archives, but based on research in the Bundesbank, the German
national archives, the Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank archives, the Bank of England
and some American archives, this article aims at rendering a comprehensive picture of the
Herstatt crisis and replace it in the wider discussions on international supervisory and
regulatory reform of the mid-1970s.8 It first looks at the origins of the Herstatt collapse in
the early 1970s, and how and why some early warnings about Herstatt’s dealings only
involved limited and ineffective regulatory/supervisory responses, in order to underscore
the inefficiency of both market self-regulation and state regulation, as well as the role
played (or not played) by the growing negative reputation of the German bank. It then
turns to the actual collapse of the bank in June 1974, and explores the issue of the timing of
the bank’s closure as well as the inappropriate resolution framework. Finally it explores
the wider regulatory issues raised by the Herstatt case, and in particular the issue of
international coordination.
2. Devisen-Roulett and Spielbank: the origins of the Herstatt collapse
A central theme of the financial regulation literature is the dichotomy between market self-
regulation and state regulation.9 For a long time – that is, from the very first rumours about
Herstatt’s risky foreign exchange operations until the actual closure of the bank – the
German authorities seem to have largely relied on some sort of market self-regulation. This
constitutes the puzzle of the Herstatt crisis: given the extent of the failure – the size of the
losses, the unrest provoked in the markets, the reputational costs incurred as well as the
prudential consequences involved – it is difficult to believe that the crisiswas unforeseeable.
This section scrutinises the early warnings about Herstatt’s activities, then it turns to the
persistence of the rumours about its over-trading in 1973 and early 1974, and finally it
examines the limited and ineffective response of the German supervisory authorities.
2.1 The Herstatt Bank and the German supervisory context
The German supervisory and regulatory authorities are essentially three: BAKred, the
Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry (Bundesministerium der Finanzen).10 BAKred,
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located in Berlin, is responsible for overseeing all German banks and taking all legal
actions in banking regulation and supervision (licensing, enforcement actions, etc).
The Bundesbank has no such responsibilities, but is involved in day-to-day regulatory and
supervisory activities, and in particular in collecting economic data and information about
banks. The decentralised structure of the Bundesbank means that Landeszentralbanken
([LBZ], central banks of the La¨nder) play an important role, as LBZ of Nordrhein-
Westfallen did in the case of Herstatt. Finally, the Finance Ministry is responsible for
banking regulation in the German government.
Jowan David Herstatt founded the eponymous bank in 1727 in Cologne.11 In 1974,
Herstatt was a rather small bank – the 80th largest in Germany – held in majority by Hans
Gerling, the head of an insurance company.12 The bank had important international
connections due to its foreign exchange trading. This made its failure the ‘worst bank
collapse since the crisis of 1931’ in Germany – although it must be noted that it was a
completely different order of magnitude.13 The failure of the bank had important domestic
(deposit insurance)14 and international consequences. As a note of the Federal Reserve of
New York reports, ‘The Herstatt failure came as a severe shock to the New York market
[...] In the two/three days just after the announcement [of Herstatt’s closure], dealers
reported a drop in business of up to 90%, with an average fall-off of roughly 75%.’15
The bank collapsed because of over-trading on the foreign currency markets. Iwan
Herstatt clearly left a lot of freedom to the foreign currency department, led by Daniel
(Dany) Dattel. The head of the foreign currency department was very respected in the
bank and beyond. He was a recognised expert in foreign exchange, regularly invited by the
media in the 1970s.16 His ‘big hour,’ as Iwan Herstatt calls it, came with the free floating of
the dollar in 1972, as this gave him opportunities in foreign currency trading.17 Yet his
irregular activities, that will be detailed below, largely caused the failure of the bank.
The relaxed attitude of Iwan Herstatt towards his bank’s foreign currency division
posed problem for the German supervisor, since, as the following pages will show,
BAKred was at regular intervals getting in touch with the one person in the bank, Iwan
Herstatt, who manifestly knew very little about what was actually going on in his own
bank. Herstatt writes in his memoirs that he gave the responsibility to supervise the foreign
currency dealings to Bernhard Graf von der Goltz, general representative of the bank, as he
was absent because of his various other responsibilities.18
The self-portrait that Iwan Herstatt draws in his memoirs is, in that respect, revealing.
He describes himself as a happy man running a healthy and prosperous bank:
‘As I celebrated my 60th birthday on 16 December 1973, I believed I had reached all what
I could have imagined in my boldest dreams.’19 He also insists on his work efficiency
(he claims it was his principle to answer letters the day they reached him at the bank, and
that he never missed a day of work nor arrived late at his office in 18 years) and claims that
‘I [ . . . ] have never been a friend of big speculative operations.’20 Herstatt clearly hoped,
even in the midst of the negotiations on 26 June, that the bank would be saved.21
2.2 Early warnings and the failure of market self-regulation
Early warnings about Herstatt’s dealings contradict the belief in market self-regulation.
The benefit of hindsight should not lead to interpret these early rumours about Herstatt’s
dealings as clear hints that the bank was doomed to collapse. Their persistence, however,
stresses that there was a long-standing problem with this bank, as well as a growing
negative reputation that did not, however, prevent some banks from carrying on dealing
with Herstatt. In its comprehensive inquiry into the origins of the Herstatt debacle,
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Der Spiegel reports hints at problems within the West German bank as early as in 1971
when the bank auditor, Heinz Laaff, then criticised Herstatt’s accounting methods.22
The Bundesbank confirmed the rumours reported by Der Spiegel. A note of the banking
and statistics department of the LZB of Nordrheinwestfalen reports discussions about
problems at Herstatt on 16 June 1971. Dr Hu¨chting, of the Westfalenbank’s board,
informed about hints that Herstatt ‘was short.’23 Symbolic of a tortuous transmission of
information about this bank, the note recording this dates back from 7 April 1972 – that is,
almost 10 months after the actual discussion took place. The information remained
confined to the LZB.24
Whether these rumours were taken seriously is an open question. A short episode
highlights this: after Herstatt’s collapse, at a meeting in Basel in 1974, Johannes Tu¨ngeler
(Bundesbank) admitted that it was the Bank of England’s hints, 18 months earlier, that first
alerted the German authorities on the situation of Herstatt.25 Strangely, however, it is the
same Tu¨ngeler himself who had, on 23 March 1972, already alerted the Bundesbank,
during a Zentralbankrat meeting, about Herstatt’s foreign exchange transactions.26
According to a reliable Swiss source, Tu¨ngeler explained, Bankhaus Herstatt had been
involved in the Swiss foreign exchange market, ‘over the 100 million DM limit’. Ernst
Fessler, president of the Nordrhein-Westfalen Landeszentralbank, recommended to
analyse the risk situation.
The results of this investigation, carried out by the banking and statistics department
of the LZB and presented on 7 April 1972, led to a critical assessment of Herstatt’s
situation.27 This judgement was based on three elements: the audit of the minimum
reserves in November 1971 (no figure was provided); the recurring difficulties in the
past three years in connection with the bank’s business expansion; indications from
banking circles of Herstatt’s risk exposure. As far as this specific investigation was
concerned, two dates had been looked at: 30 November 1971 and 29 February 1972
(see Table 1).
The note concluded that these figures were not so high that they must be reported to the
Bundesbank. But it also added that ‘the presumption is, though, that these figures do not
reproduce the true extent of the foreign exchange transactions.’ Three elements motivated
this remark. Firstly, the audit of the reserve requirements in November 1971 had revealed
a discrepancy between the last month, reaching its lowest situation under 100 million DM,
Table 1. Results of the investigation of the banking and statistics department of the
Landeszentralbank on Bankhaus Herstatt’s activities, April 1972.
30 November 1971 29 February 1972
- in million DM -
I. Assets in foreign banks and companies
a) in currency 59.0 80.0
b) in DM 64.4 72.4
Total 123.4 152.4
of which Switzerland 32.0 44.6
II. Liabilities towards foreign
banks and companies
a) in currency 36.0 21.4
b) in DM 76.1 53.5
Total 112.1 74.9
of which Switzerland 30.8 25.0
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and the current month, rising up to 350 million DM. But in the present case, the weekly
data did not report any figure which was considered as inappropriate (Table 2).
Secondly, the banking and statistics department noted that the monthly data was
missing. The Swiss source which had been reporting excessive operations might have
referred to daily swap operations (which, the department notes, had already played a role
in the November audit). These operations show up as a one-day operation and could have
indeed constituted the Swiss information. And they do not appear in the balances of the
bank. Thirdly, the Swiss informant could have mixed up the Bankhaus-Herstatt Ko¨ln with
its sister bank ‘Compagnie financie`re Herstatt S.A.’ based in Luxembourg. But LBZ did
not have any documents about the operations of the parent bank.
This series of events, from June 1971 to the above-mentioned investigation, led LBZ’s
banking and statistics department to a critical assessment of the bank’s situation.
‘We suggest,’ the report concluded, ‘to seize now the new information from the Swiss side
as an opportunity to inform the Bundesaufsichtsamt in detail about our observations and
misgivings.’ Fessler just wrote in the margin of the note ‘agreed.’ Coincidence or not,
Dr Stauch, of the Bundesaufsichtsamt, and Iwan Herstatt talked over the phone in mid-
April 1972.28 The detail of the discussions is not available, but the archival record states
that they discussed the question of Herstatt’s capital increase, its ‘repeated’ exceeding of
limits in the activities (also of the Herstatt’s sister bank in Luxembourg) on the money
market and risks resulting thereof. Reporting back the discussion, Stauch concluded that
‘these matters will have to be followed in detail in prudential terms.’
2.3 From failed self-regulation to poor oversight
But the fact that the market and the regulators knew about Herstatt’s unenviable reputation
suggests that if self-regulation was ineffective, public regulation did not satisfactorily
work either. Already in 1971 and 1972 indeed, Herstatt had attracted the attention of the
German regulatory and supervisory authorities. On 9 July 1973 in Cologne, Stauch again
reported to Herstatt the rumours that were circulating about his bank.29 A foreign bank30
had indicated to Stauch on 5 July 1973 that rumours were circulating about Herstatt in
London. Herstatt replied that he was taking things very seriously and was aware of such
rumours, but that they were however unfounded. He stated that his bank was not involved
in the Bau-Kredit-Bank, a German bank that failed in June 1973.31 The currency dealings
were checked daily by Graf von der Goltz and the bank’s financial position in the last five
months, Herstatt reports, were outstanding.
New rumours about Herstatt, from three different sources, reached Stauch on
10 December, who then immediately decided to call Iwan Herstatt.32 Rumours had it that
the bank had daily contracts of between 200 and 500 million DM. This was causing
concern in the ‘big banks’, that is, the three German ‘big banks’: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner
Bank and Commerzbank. Stauch also expressed doubts that the general representative
Table 2. Results of the investigation of the banking and statistics department of the
Landeszentralbank on Bankhaus Herstatt’s activities, weekly data, April 1972.
23 November 1971 23 February 1972
- in million DM -
Assets in foreign banks and companies 253.9 112.5
Liabilities towards foreign banks and companies 141.5 66.2
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exercised a sufficient control of the currency traders.33 Herstatt dismissed this gossip,
adding that he had to live with it since the founding of his bank, that is, for 18 years.34
He further argued that his bank was in a better state than before. Stauch called Iwan
Herstatt on 12 December. Herstatt explained to him that the traders had a limit of
25 million DM for open positions.35 The discussion did not go further. On 18 December,
Stauch, following the rumours about foreign exchange transactions, considered calling on
auditors to Herstatt – he eventually did not seem to have done so. The note adds that from
that day on, the LZB has shared all information and rumours which it was aware of with
BAKred.
The foreign exchange department of LBZ, following a note of the Bundesaufsichtsamt
dated 12 December 1973 reported, on 21 December 1973, on the open positions taken by
Herstatt (Table 3).36 It gave account of new rumours in Du¨sseldorf among foreign
currency traders, according to which Herstatt went ‘off the mark’ with considerable
amounts since the continuous rise of the dollar since late October 1973 and the devaluation
of the franc since September 1973. But in fact the note goes on . . . to defend Herstatt,
saying that there is little ‘concrete observations’ to support the rumours. The first point,
already evoked before, concerned swap operations: it may have been that Herstatt tried to
put off losses by making a considerable amount of swap operations. The note further adds
that in the opinion of a foreign exchange trader, the supposition of a substantial imbalance
could be explained by the fact that the Chefha¨ndler had recently been appointed
Volldirektor: ‘he must prove himself, otherwise his promotion would be “a big bluff”.’ No
specific name is provided, so it is unclear whether this remark may be referring to Dany
Dattel. There remains that engaging in risky behaviour to establish a reputation has often
been observed since the early 1970s.37 This also further highlights the importance of
reputation in business history – both in positive and, in the present case, negative terms.38
The second point is more general, and concerns the operations of Herstatt over the past six
Table 3. Investigation of the foreign exchange department of the Landeszentralbank into Bankhaus
Herstatt’s activities, December 1973.
Net foreign-exchange positions of I.D. Herstatt KGaA, Ko¨ln
- operations in million DM -
$ £ FF Hfl Lit
1972
October 27.3 þ2.4 þ2.0 þ2.0 þ1.1
November 215.6 þ4.7 þ2.8 þ1.6 þ1.2
December 229.7 þ1.3 þ1.3 þ1.5 þ0.2
1973
January þ4.8 þ2.2 þ2.1 þ0.5 þ0.3
February þ33.9 þ2.1 þ1.7 212.3 þ0.6
March þ5.0 þ1.3 þ1.2 20.1 þ0.6
April þ11.4 þ2.2 þ0.7 20.1 þ0.6
May 217.4 þ0.7 20.8 20.9 þ0.4
June þ33.9 þ2.3 21.2 þ1.5 þ0.4
July 224.5 þ16.4 þ2.8 þ0.3 þ0.4
August þ41.1 þ2.8 21.6 þ3.2 þ0.7
September þ92.2 þ3.4 21.2 þ5.3 þ0.6
October þ79.3 þ2.1 þ3.1 þ55.8 þ0.5
November þ173.1 þ1.6 þ0.9 þ28.5 20.8
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months. Since July 1973 and the low point of the dollar, Herstatt has in no case gone ‘off
the mark.’ The note contains a table of Herstatt’s positions supporting this (Table 3).
Incidentally, Herstatt was not the only German bank to suffer from such rumours.
WestLB and Bankhauses Lampe were, too, said to be in difficulty.39 Whether this should
be reassuring in itself is not sure, and is not dealt with in the note. On 11 January 1974, it
was commented that ‘the Bundesausichtsamt will ask Herstatt to commission its auditor
first to examine its foreign exchange positions and then to report to them.’40
The situation worsened in early 1974, underlining that neither the building of a
consistent unenviable reputation nor supervisory responses were able to pre-empt the
development of risky trading behaviour in the bank. On 9 January 1974, in a note to Otmar
Emminger (the vice-president of the Bundesbank), Rolf Gocht and Tu¨ngeler report that a
colleague of the Bank of England stated that Herstatt no longer especially disturbed them,
since English banks had in the meantime refused to conclude operations with the Cologne
bank.41 About two weeks later, new rumours about Herstatt’s over-trading reached
German authorities – ‘once more,’ as the note puts it.42 Edgar Krug (LBZ) and Stauch
talked about it over the phone, on 25 January 1974. They were concerned not only by the
activities of the Cologne bank but also by those of its Luxembourg subsidiary. Krug
suggested to invite Iwan Herstatt to Berlin, where BAKred’s headquarters were, and added
that LBZ would be interested in being represented at such a meeting. Stauch agreed and
recalled that he was anyway expecting the report of the auditing company about Herstatt’s
annual account.
The next response of the Bundesbank, confronted with press reports, hints from banks
and other rumours about Herstatt’s dealing, was to rely on some sort of informal
supervision. On 29 January 1974, the Direktorium sent a letter to the board members, as
well as to the Bundesaufsichtsamt, raising the issue of risks in open foreign exchange
exposure.43 ‘Since in our opinion the absolute ban on making open foreign exchange
transactions would go well too far and also go against legal considerations, only measures
through which the above-mentioned risks are limited come into question.’ What to do was
still left open, and the letter only suggested that BAKred could warn about such risks.
Rumours about Herstatt’s operation reached the international central banking stage
soon after – ironically highlighting that international cooperation and the sharing of
gossip, one of the first topics of discussion of the BCBS the following year,44 did not prove
more effective. On 11 and 12 February 1974, during a meeting of central bank governors
in Basel, Karl Klasen, president of the Bundesbank, was indeed alerted by some of his
colleagues about Herstatt’s operations.45 But Iwan Herstatt reassured once again German
authorities on 16 February 1974. He talked over the phone with Herr Eckey, director of the
Bundesbank Hauptstelle in Cologne, and explained that his bank did not have any open
foreign exchange position, and that it made no loss on its open foreign exchange positions
in the last months.46 It is important to note that Herstatt was not, again, an isolated case.
The Herstatt example was in fact reported together with two other instances, the
Westdeutschen Landesbank and the Bankhaus Lampe (which suffered a 2 million DM loss
over Swiss franc positions in March 1973). But of all three cases, Herstatt seemed to be the
most worrying – to such an extent that, in mid-February, Stauch wrote to Herstatt to ask
him to carry out a ‘particularly close examination of the forward book.’47
Concrete hints such as the fact, highlighted in January, that some English banks
refused to conclude operations with Herstatt, occurred again in March. They highlight an
important degree of information asymmetry between the banks; and also show that
self-regulation, because of these asymmetries, could not work. It is noticeable that during
this critical period when many rumours circulated about the bank’s foreign currency
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operations in February–March 1974, Iwan Herstatt was on holidays.48 On 8 March, the
foreign exchange department of LBZ reported, ‘from absolutely credible sources,’ that
‘numerous’ banks involved in foreign exchange trading now refused to deal with
Herstatt.49 If the sources in question were not disclosed, it is noticeable that, however
diplomatic it was, the description of the quality of the source was this time even more
underscored. All this remained at the level of rumours – but the room left for doubt was,
this time, considerably reduced. On 14 March 1974, an unidentified French bank asked the
German Bankhaus C.G. Trinkhaus & Burkhardt, which then reported it to LBZ, whether a
specific bank in Nordrhein-Westfalen had difficulties in the foreign exchange market.50
It was assumed that the French bank was thinking of Herstatt – though of course the reply
given was that no one was aware of such problems.
The gossip according to which some banks refused to contract on the foreign exchange
market led LBZ to try and understand why this was so. The foreign currency department of
LBZ hence talked to Herr Bierbaum, exchange broker at the Du¨sseldorf stock exchange, in
order to better grasp the situation. In a note dated 15 March 1974, the foreign currency
department reports that Bierbaum explained that most banks implied in foreign exchange
transactions set a limit to their tradingwith their possible partners on themarket.51 The limit
is determined by the size and the reputation of each partner.And once the limit is reached, no
more trading can take place. Bierbaum added to this that the will to no longer deal with a
specific bank can also come from ‘animosities’ between the banks. The example given was
that of theWestfalenbank and the Bankhaus Herstatt. Still on Herstatt, Bierbaum explicitly
said that the instructions not to deal with it ‘can be put down to the fact that Herstatt had
reached the respective limit.’ The Devisenabteilung only commented that ‘the increase of
such instructions furthermore shows that the banks are eager to limit risks in foreign
currency dealings.’ Hence LBZ suspected, at least as early as on 15March, that Herstatt had
reached its limit in foreign exchange trading; while simultaneously congratulating itself for
the alleged moderation of bankers on the foreign exchange market.
It was on 22 March 1974 that, for the first time, not only Iwan Herstatt but also Graf
von der Goltz, general representative of the bank, admitted having ‘concluded in fact large
[foreign exchange] transactions.’52 At the instigation of Thoma, vice-president of LBZ,
Eckey had talked to Iwan Herstatt and Graf von der Goltz. Both Herstatt and von der Goltz
however added that these foreign exchange positions had been kept ‘relatively low.’ They
further assured that they oversaw these operations so closely that a notable risk was
excluded and would not arise in the future. When Eckey mentioned the rumour according
to which some banks would have withdrawn from foreign exchange dealings with
Herstatt, the banker responded that this gossip was ‘without any basis.’ He was aware that
his bank was suffering such rumours ‘surely out of jealousy’ – a claim that he repeated in
his memoirs53 – and that he could not do anything against it. These ongoing rumours
about Herstatt relate again with the wider issue of reputation in banking. In explaining the
importance of a positive reputation, Christopher Kobrak underscores that it can outlive the
original qualities that it took to build.54 The Herstatt story is in a sense showing that the
exact opposite is also true: Herstatt had been building a negative reputation from 1971 at
least, but somehow some market actors and regulators overlooked the origins of this
reputation and carried on dealing with the German bank regardless.
2.4 Ineffective supervisory responses
Confronted with the rumours that Herstatt was in a bad situation, what was the reaction of
the German supervisors and regulators? It is of course difficult to reconstruct BAKred’s
8 E. Mourlon-Druol
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reaction because of the closure of its archives. But had it had taken an important measure
in the years 1971 to 1974, some archival trace would have probably subsisted in other
institutions’ archives – and indeed this is the case in the Bundesbank archives, given its
strong implication in the German financial supervisory and regulatory process. For the
period 1971–1973, the German authorities appear to have limited their action to
investigations and phone calls. This remained largely ineffective however, as risky dealing
persisted. From early 1974 onwards, they attempted a more formal reaction, and wrote a
warning letter to German banking federations.
A first move from the German supervisory office dates from 25 February 1974 –
shortly after Klasen’s meeting in Basle on 11 and 12 February – when BAKred wrote to
the Karoli Wirtschaftspru¨fung GmBH, the company in charge of the annual audit of
Herstatt.55 Stauch asked the auditor to pay particular attention to the nature and dimension
of the risks taken by the bank in its foreign exchange operations. It is also interesting to
note, in terms of supervisory practices, that it is reported that it would have been the LZB
which was at the origin of this letter, as it disseminated new rumours about Herstatt’s
possible over-trading to the Bundesaufsichtsamt, and pressed the German supervisor to
take some action.
The report provided by the Karoli Wirtschaftspru¨fung disclosed the currency positions
presented in Table 4.56 The report notes that ‘from the operations of January and February
1974 we did not gain any clue indicating that the bank is in difficulty.’
The auditor writes that the foreign exchange division was composed of seven active
traders. Operations were registered in a computer (a Nixdorf-Kleincomputeranlage), and a
list of these operations was printed daily. The Karoli Wirtschaftspru¨fung concluded from
this survey: ‘We consider the current technical organisation as sufficent to process the
volume of transactions.’
What the Karoli Wirthschaftspru¨fung did not find out, however, was the existence of a
‘cancel button’ (Abbruchtaste). Using this button allowed the trader’s operations not to
Table 4. Report of the Karoli-Wirtschafspru¨fung on Bankhaus Herstatt’s currency positions,
February 1974.
US-$ against
DM Swiss francs Pound sterling Hfl Saldo
1974
January þ504.0 2102.0 2303.0 þ79.0 þ178.0
February þ303.1 þ10.2 þ260.6 þ84.0 þ657.9
March 2373.7 þ111.0 25.7 235.5 2303.9
April 2217.7 þ7.0 232.0 2242.7
May 2218.9 2378.6 240.6 þ20.0 þ139.1
June þ68.3 þ100.0 – 249.5 þ118.8
July 241.7 – – – 241.7
August 263.3 þ365.0 – 266.0 þ235.7
September 222.5 – – – 222.5
October 27.3 þ200.0 – – þ192.7
November 215.3 – – – 215.3
December 235.2 – – – 235.2
2120.2 þ1062.8 281.7 – þ860.9
1975 257.1 – – – 257.1
1976–1979 292.5 – – – 292.5
2269.8 þ1062.8 281.7 – þ711.3
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appear in the daily list of operations carried out by the bank, printed out by the computer.
Herstatt explains that Dattel could use this cancel button and could thus manipulate the
daily balance sheets. According to Der Spiegel, this function had been used increasingly
frequently since early 1973.57 Herstatt adds in his memoirs that he has ‘subsequently
found that Herr Dattel occasionally exceeded his limit up to 750 million.’58
Three days later, on 28 February, the banking supervision experts of LBZ met with
representatives of BAKred at the Bundesbank.59 This was not a meeting organised on
purpose given the ongoing rumours, rather a customary gathering. Yet given the
circumstances, one of the important topics of discussion concerned the risks linked to open
foreign exchange exposure of banks. The record of the discussion does not show any
explicit mention of Herstatt – or indeed any other case such as the Bankhaus Lampe, or the
Westdeutschen Landesbank mentioned before. Nevertheless, the meeting recommended
three measures that are important with respect to regulatory and supervisory practices: to
write a warning letter to banking associations, to amend the test guidelines, and to report
statistics of forward exchange contracts (the returns which have to be submitted to
BAKred did not show forward foreign exchange commitments). ‘A ban on proprietary
trading appears in fact from a prudential perspective as the best solution, in order not to
load the anyway meagre equity of the banks also with the risks of that kind of operations.’
Yet it was concluded that such a step could not be taken, either from a legal or a practical
perspective – a warning letter was thus the best option left.
On 11 March 1974, Stauch told Herstatt that Klasen had received information about
risks in the bank’s currency dealings.60 Stauch expressed doubts about von der Goltz’s
daily controls of the currency positions. This was the first time that Stauch demonstrated
such specific doubts related to the way in which daily operations were recorded in the
bank. Stauch asked to see the annual report of the bank (Iwan Herstatt handed it over to
Stauch on 25 April),61 and concluded that were no changes to follow, he saw a threat to the
existence of the bank. Herstatt protested and affirmed that everything was in order.
A further meeting took place, on 28 March 1974, between representatives of the
Bundesaufsichtsamt, LBZ and the Direktorium of the Bundesbank in order to draft the
warning letter evoked above.62 On 6 May 1974 Du¨rre sent the letter to the main German
banking federations. It is quite surprising to observe it took nearly 10 weeks to write a fairly
general two-page long letter, especially given the persistent rumours evoked above.
He intended to warn banks about ‘risks in forward foreign exchange transactions.’63 Du¨rre’s
opening was very didactic, explaining that foreign exchange transactions had become riskier
since the end of the fixed exchange rates regime, which led some banks to encounter ‘not
insignificant losses.’ He did not, however, provide the names of the banks in question. ‘This
prompts me,’ Du¨rre explained, ‘to alert you on these developments, and to ask you not to
speculate in foreign currencies. If foreign exchange transactions are carried out, you must
circumscribe their perimeter in such away that also the external calculable risk can beworked
out in all cases without endangering the creditors of the banks.’ Du¨rre added that it was the
responsibility of each bank’s management to take all the necessary measures so that ‘an
effective control of this field ofwork is guaranteed.’ The president of theBundesaufsichtsamt
thenmade clear that the auditorwas responsible for inspecting the effectiveness of the system
of control, and had to report on it, including the development of risks in foreign exchange
transactions (both already completed during the year, and those still open). The German
supervisory office’swarning letterwas certainly sent off too late, however.Herstatt carried on
its business, the collapse of which is the focus of the next section.
On 25April 1974, Stauch andHerstatt talked in Berlin. Herstatt handed over the balance
sheet for 1973.64 It showed positions with a risk of $12 million.65 Herstatt dismissed the
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conjectures that some currency operations could possibly be implemented under a cover
address. He reiterated that under his instruction no open position could be taken over
25million DM, and that the general representative, von der Goltz, carried out daily controls
of these positions. He described Herr Dattel, the currency trader, as ‘an excellent expert.’66
The publication, in late April, of Herstatt’s annual report, showed a constant increase
of the annual profit as well as the ‘other incomes’ (Table 5). What the audit report added to
this was the income from foreign exchange transactions, which jumped from 3.7 million
DM in 1972 to 40.4 million DM in 1973.67 LBZ later acknowledged this.
In a meeting of Herstatt’s supervisory board in late April it was reported that during the
first quarter of 1974 there existed hidden reserves of 30–40 million DM, and this was
confirmed by Dr Christoph of the Karoli-Wirthschaftspru¨fung.68 Dr Christoph warned in
May 1974 about an expansion in currency operations. Anton Weiler, the financial officer,
wrote to Herstatt on 17 May 1974 to request information about these currency operations.
Herstatt replied on 22 May 1974 that everything was in order, reminded again that the
daily limit for open currency operations was 25 million DM, and that the profit up to now
in currency operations was of 4 million DM.
3. A failed resolution
Herstatt’s situation suddenly worsened in June 1974. This section analyses how this
happened, andwhy theGerman authorities decided to close the bank rather than to bail it out.
3.1 Diary of the collapse
Before turning to this examination however, it is first necessary to examine when the
German authorities actually realised the situation in which Herstatt found itself. The
previous section has shown that rumours had been going on for quite a while about
Herstatt’s difficulties and questionable practices, and thereby highlighted both the failure
of market self-regulation and the poor performance of the supervisors and regulators.
Yet they did not prompt the German supervisory office to take immediate concrete
measures, as it probably considered that the extent of the problem was not too worrying.
According to the Bank of England, ‘It was, apparently, in the week ending 22nd June that
the enormity of Herstatt’s losses became revealed.’69
Table 5. Audit report on Bankhaus Herstatt, April 1974.
- figures in million DM -
Financial
year
Annual profit
( ¼ balance sheet
profit þ
additional
reserves)
‘Other incomes’
(source:
published
results)
Ordinary
income
(source: audit
report)
Income from
foreign exchange
(source: audit
report)
As
percentage
of the
ordinary
income
1970 3.3 11.7 30.0 1.2 4.0
1971 4.9 10.8 39.4 5.9 15.0
1972 7.8 17.5 42.9 3.7 þ 6.1 (income
from precious
metals trading)
8.6
1973 10.0 55.1 70.5 40.4 þ 9.5 (income
from precious
metals trading)
57.3
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Iwan Herstatt became aware of the first significant losses of his bank on 10 June.
On that day von der Goltz called Herstatt to tell him that ‘we have been lied to, and
suffered around 100 million losses in currency trading in the current year.’70 Once back in
Cologne, Herstatt learnt that the effective loss was somewhat lower, at 64 million. As a
consequence, he decided, with regret, to sell back the bank’s building to the Gerling
group. On 14 June, when the transaction took place, Herstatt asked Dattel, to be sure,
whether there were no further losses. ‘Herr Dattel explained me with a firm voice that no
further losses existed. Relieved, I closed the meeting.’71 Following further investigation
on 13 and 14 June 1974, it appeared that the losses were significantly higher than
expected.72 The figures were incorrectly reported in the books. These losses were
dissimulated through fictious swap operations with Econ Bank, Zu¨rich (around 450 million
DM) and fictious amounts of currency reserves (around 350 million DM). After deduction
of realised and unrealised profit from currency and gold dealings as well as of the hidden
reserves in estates of the bank, there remained an uncovered loss of around 470 million
DM. Gerling promised to balance this personally.
Shortly after the first discovery of the losses on 10 June, some alerts reached German
supervisors. On 12 June 1974, LBZ wrote to the Cologne Hauptstelle about Herstatt’s
sudden rise of debts with foreign banks: ‘Checking through the monthly data of Bankhaus
Herstatt, it is striking that the receivables due daily to foreign banks have raised in April of
this year by 283 to reach 589 and in May this year by a further 257 to reach 846; so that
they reach a good third of the bank’s balance sheet of 2421.’73 The situation of Herstatt’s
subsidiary in Luxembourg was equally a source of concern. LBZ reported that it had risen
by 4067 million lfrs to 5554 million lfrs (that is, by 260 million DM to 360 million DM) in
April of this year. The May figures were as yet unavailable, preventing LBZ from drawing
conclusions as to the further transfer of funds from Herstatt to its Luxembourg subsidiary.
Nevertheless, LBZ concluded that ‘Since the shown development is possibly not
completely harmless, we ask to obtain immediate written detailed clarifications from
Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt.’ LBZ specifically looked for three elements: the identity of the
foreign banks concerned, the reason for this unusual rise in liabilities, and the extent to
which Herstatt was sure to be able to repay these debts without causing problems for the
borrowers.
That same day, Stauch spoke to Iwan Herstatt about the activities of his bank with his
subsidiary in Luxembourg.74 He pointed out that ‘the amounts due daily now of about 900
million DM put at the disposition of the Luxembourg bank should be put off.’ Iwan
Herstatt commented that the increase of these amounts was due to the repercussions of the
collapse of Bau-Kredit-Bank, it was difficult, also in Luxembourg, to finance itself.
In addition, he told Stauch that ‘at present, only still 400–450 million DM of amounts due
daily have been given to the Luxembourg subsidiary, the rest concerns other banks.’
Stauch asked Herstatt to provide ‘on a voluntary basis and until further notice’, via LBZ,
a quarterly status report of the development of the Luxembourg subsidiary. This was an
interesting step as it stressed an attempt, by the German Federal supervisor, to monitor the
activities of an overseas subsidiary.
On 19 June, LBZ Cologne Hauptstelle received from Herstatt – ‘following a
reminder’ – the report of the Karoli-Wirtschaftspru¨fungs-GmbH about the annual
accounts.75 It contained the data presented in Table 6.
The report commented: ‘considerable profit, no clue of “difficulties”’ and ‘satisfactory
technical organisation for completion of operations.’ The archival record is silent for the
period going from 19 June and LBZ consultation of the auditors report on Herstatt, until
the beginning of the negotiations about Herstatt’s rescue four days later.
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3.2 A false dilemma: continuation or liquidation
Intense discussions took place from 23 June until 26 June, date of the official closure of the
bank. These discussions focused on what to do with Bankhaus Herstatt once the losses had
been discovered, namely, to close the bank or to try to save it. These meetings involved the
German supervisory authorities, representatives from Herstatt (Iwan Herstatt notes he
unfortunately was not involved in the negotiations)76 and a representative of the German
‘big banks’. The Bundesbank learnt on Saturday 22 June in the evening the Herstatt losses;
BAKred did so on Sunday 23 in the evening. Both became aware of the irregularities only
in the course of the negotiations for saving the bank.77
After various meetings with Fessler, Du¨rre, Klasen and representatives of the Gerling
group, the figure of 470 million DM losses in foreign exchange dealings was advanced on
23 June.78 Gerling, himself, offered to pay off these losses from his personal wealth and
this possibility was discussed in the Landeszentralbank of Nordrhein Westfalen on
24 June. Because the Gerling group never published a consolidated balance sheet, it was
agreed that Gerling’s pledge could not be considered as reliable – unless a ‘big bank’
would guarantee it. In any case it was considered that Gerling could not bear this burden
over the long-term; in addition to concerns that the final losses might be a lot higher than
predicted at the time. The discussion carried on in the afternoon of 24 June in Bonn.
Gerling confirmed his readiness to take on responsibility for Herstatt’s losses but Du¨rre
clearly doubted that Gerling could carry out such an operation in the given circumstances.
The discussion then moved on to the disadvantages of a collapse of Herstatt Bank. Fessler
noted that there were two options: rehabilitation through the guarantee of one or more ‘big
bank’, or liquidation. He clearly stated that, in his opinion, there was no interest in the
preservation of the bank. In an effort to gather the necessary support from a ‘big bank’,
Gerling nominated Franz Heinrich Ulrich, spokesman of the Deutsche Bank’s board of
managing directors, as the biggest and most probable consortium bank leader to speak to.
The participants adjourned the meeting and agreed to reconvene the next day, once Ulrich
could be consulted.
A preparatory meeting took place beforehand at the Bundesbank, on 25 June, with the
Direktorium of the Bundesbank, Fessler, Stauch and Du¨rre. The principal outcome of this
encounter was agreement among the participants, following Klasen’s advice, on the need
for a cautious attitude in the negotiations with Ulrich. In informing the Direktorium, Du¨rre
once more expressed his scepticism at Gerling’s plan. Out of the 470 million DM losses,
he considered that the Gerling group would only realistically be able to bear the burden of
200 million DM, at a 10% interest over 10 years. The remaining 270 million DM would
have to be taken on from outside, like a ‘big bank’ consortium, perhaps even backed by a
counter-guarantee of the Federal Republic.
The meeting with Ulrich and the other participants then took place at the Bundesbank,
later on 25 June.79 Ulrich said that a rescue of Herstatt was not impossible, but that action
should be taken urgently. He added that for the Deutsche Bank the figures mentioned were
too high to take on alone, and that only a consortium of the three ‘big banks’ could be
envisaged. Du¨rre repeated his scepticism about a ‘Gerling-only’ option, without guarantee
Table 6. Report of the Karoli-Wirtschaftspru¨fung on Bankhaus Herstatt’s annual accounts, June
1974.
Turnover in foreign exchange trading in 1973 64 billion DM
Open position per 31 December 1973 711 million US$
Open position per 8 February 1974 80 million US$
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from the ‘big banks’ and reiterated his idea of a partial contribution from Gerling (but this
time the figure of 270 million DM was given) combined with a guarantee of the ‘big
banks’ for the rest (200 million DM) on an acknowledgement of debt by Gerling. Gerling
seemed to agree to that solution. Incidentally, Du¨rre explained that at the moment they
were talking, Herstatt still had excessive debts, and ‘this forces the Bundesaufsichtsamt to
immediately close the bank’ – and that as a consequence the liquidity issue was only a
matter of hours. This shows that a closure of the bank was explicitly envisaged at least
24 hours before the actual decision was taken. This confirms some criticisms aired in New
York.80 Ulrich objected that if Gerling was ready to take on Herstatt’s debts, there was no
liquidity issue. Du¨rre replied that there existed doubts as to Gerling’s capacity to actually
take on these debts. Gerling said that one should rely on his word.
The meeting taking place on 26 June started with some delay, only at 13:20 – due to a
delayed departure of the flight and traffic jams, the reports says.81 This detail is not so
trivial as it highlights that the decision to close Herstatt might have been taken a bit earlier,
had the meeting begun in timely fashion. In summarising the situation, Ulrich identified
two problems: one was limited to Herstatt and its liquidity and capital issues; the other was
more general, a crisis of confidence in the banking industry. Working out the first one
would not solve the second, however. Ulrich recalled that Herstatt, for a long time, was
considered very critically from outside. On top of this, the 470 million DM figure did not
represent all losses, but necessarily all the actual ones, as a dissimulation of the losses for
‘a small quarter of the balance is possible,’ Ulrich suggested.82 Indeed the ‘big banks’ also
take into account ‘not insignificant risks’ linked to the securities and the debtors.
A continuation of the Herstatt Bank, was not, therefore, possible. Gerling concurred, and
withdrew his original offer. A report of the Commerzbank anyway noted that ‘from the
discussions [ . . . ] we had the impression that Herr Gerling no longer mastered the thing.
He mixed up the simplest ideas [ . . . ].’83 Essentially, the Deutsche Bank pulled out of its
support for the rescue of Herstatt and it was doomed to immediate closure. The three ‘big
banks’ refused to save Herstatt also because the real amount of the losses was not clear.84
The Bundesaufsichtsamt confirmed that ‘at this point the withdrawal of the authorisation
[was] to start immediately.’ Fessler left the meeting at 14:10, in order to give the order to
the Landeszentralbank of Nordrhein-Westfalen to count the statement.
Du¨rre and the signatory drafted the authorisation’s withdrawal, and tried to contact
Iwan Herstatt. When Iwan Herstatt called back, he said that he still could not explain how
the bank arrived at this situation. Indeed, during his last conversation with him over the
phone on 12 June, Stauch reported that Iwan Herstatt still considered that his foreign
exchange dealings were in credit of 50 million DM. Stauch interrupted Herstatt and
explained that the ongoing negotiations involving the Bundesaufsichtsamt, the
Bundesbank, the ‘big banks’ and Gerling had failed to reach a solution to cover the
bank’s debts, and that as a consequence, Herstatt had to be closed. Iwan Herstatt replied
that he was not aware of such ongoing negotiations. He himself of course did not have
enough money to cover the bank’s debts, and could only accept the liquidation. This could
not be processed over the phone, however, and had to be done in Cologne – although he
could be legally prosecuted if he had taken on new operations after the time the
authorisation’s withdrawal had been announced to him, that is, at 14:40. The order to close
the counter was given at 15:00 to the financial officer Herr Weiler at Herstatt. Graf von der
Goltz, general representative at Herstatt, called Stauch around 15:20/15:30 to know what
was going on: he stated that around 15:00 Iwan Herstatt had suddenly left the bank and
was since then impossible to reach. Stauch explained him the situation. It took therefore
three days of intense discussions to arrive at a conclusion that Du¨rre had apparently
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foreseen from the beginning, namely that Gerling’s plans to save the bank were unreliable,
and that Herstatt would have to be closed. Added to the unfortunate delayed meeting of
26 June, it shows how German authorities seemed to have no awareness of the
international consequences a closure of Herstatt would have. This logically gave more
prominence later on to the need for international coordination.
4. Reforming an ineffective supervision
Herstatt’s collapse raised two major questions: why didn’t the German authorities take any
concrete measure prior to the crisis eruption? And what reaction did the collapse of
Herstatt spur among German and international supervisors and regulators?
4.1 A foretold failure?
As the previous sections made plain, not only rumours but also fairly tangible evidence
made clear that the Bankhaus Herstatt was in danger. Yet the German authorities never
went beyond pious calls and informal supervision. From the first contacts between
BAKred in mid-1972 until early 1974, German authorities mainly maintained informal
contacts with the bank, and scrutinised auditing reports. It is clear from the German
archival record that German authorities – that is, Bundesbank, BAKred, finance ministry
and LBZ alike – were suspicious of Herstatt’s activities. The German governement was
aware since around mid-1973, thanks to information gathered by BAKred and the
Bundesbank, that rumours were circulating that Herstatt carried unusually high currency
operations.85 The German finance ministry however states that ‘it is not accurate that the
bank effectively lived from 1970 to 1972 from foreign exchange transactions.’ To sustain
this claim, the German finance ministry recalls the foreign currency dealings as a
percentage of total ordinary income that are summed up in Table 7.
Of course, the 1973 figure is very striking. Yet the German finance ministry claims that
it became aware only very late of the situation. The audit report of the Karoli-
Wirtschaftspru¨fung for 1973 was published in April 1974, it went to BaKred on 18 June,
and to LBZ only on 19 June. ‘In light of the following developments there was no more
scope, time-wise, for eventual banking supervisory measures,’ the German finance
ministry notes.86
What is more surprising is that the German authorities themselves did not seem to
remember these suspicious activities very well (or did not want to). In two different
instances, one taken from each of the two most important German institutions involved
in the policy process, that is, the Bundesbank and BAKred, the recollection of events was
quite vague. As noted above, it was from a Swiss source that the first real alert came, in
March 1972. And it is the same person – Tu¨ngeler – who both acknowledged that the
Bank of England attracted his attention to the Herstatt situation, while he himself had
already explicitly pointed at the German bank’s problems. The second such example
comes from BAKred. After Herstatt’s collapse, Stauch told a Bank of England official
that ‘it was in the summer 1973 that rumours first percolated to the Supervisory Office
that Herstatt were over-trading in foreign currencies.’87 As much as Tu¨ngeler
misrepresentation (equally told to the Bank of England), this is quite inexact: as noted
above, Stauch himself talked over the phone with Herstatt as early as in mid-April 1972
about the bank’s ‘repeated’ exceeding of the limits in its activities on the money market.
He had even concluded that this would have to be ‘followed in detail in prudential
terms.’88
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Whether this vague recollection of events is voluntary or not is difficult to tell, but in
any case it does highlight well both a problem of coordination within the German
administration – information was seemingly not passed on to the responsible authorities
very well – and also the difficulty to really gauge the activity of Bankhaus Herstatt, and
whether or not it was really overtrading. LBZ stated that it received Herstatt’s annual
report only in late April 1974 – an annual report which did not contain details about the
bank’s foreign exchange transactions.89 These were set out in the auditor’s report, which
LBZ received, ‘after a reminder,’ on 19 June – that is, once further developments had
rendered belated any new measure. Why LBZ or the Bundesaufsichtsamt did not try to
insist further (and, most importantly, earlier) to obtain more details about Herstatt’s
foreign exchange positions remains an open question. The fact that BAKred had changed
its strategy in early 1974 by sending out a warning letter to German banking federations
was certainly too little, too late. It is also surprising that some German authorities
somewhat felt helpless.90 For instance, although it was aware that many banks refused to
deal with Herstatt on the foreign exchange market, LBZ did not take any further action.
A comment added after the 8 March note reporting further instances of banks refusing to
deal with Herstatt explained that ‘the LBZ had no occasion to take further steps, because
the auditing instructions given by the Bundesaufsichtsamt to the auditor about the
investigation of the foreign exchange transactions had just been extended.’91
Not only had many rumours circulated prior to 1974 about Herstatt’s risky foreign
exchange dealings, but also the possibility of closing Herstatt had already been explicitly
evoked by the Bundesaufsichtamt at least 24 hours prior to the actual closure. And it is not
only that the three ‘big banks’ were unwilling to back Gerling’s plan, it was also that Du¨rre
himself, from the very beginning did not believe in it and refused to support it. At least
24 hours before the actual closure of the bank, Du¨rre hence explicitly evoked the
possibility of closing down Herstatt. It is also striking to note that the delay in taking
the official decision to close Herstatt at 14:40 had been influenced by the delay with which
the last meeting had started – itself the result of a flight delay and traffic jams.
4.2 International consequences
The collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt had two main consequences: it affected international
financial markets, and as a consequence it spurred reflection on German and international
supervisory and regulatory reform. The most obvious consequence of the liquidation of
Herstatt was that the reputation of German banks seemed severely hit. Herstatt Bank was
the third German bank to run into difficulties because of foreign exchange transactions.
The other two cases were the Westdeutsche Landesbank-Girozentrale and the Hessische
Landesbank.92 The latter led to the resignation of its president. The closure of the Bass and
Herz Bank later in 1974, although in no way related to Herstatt (the failure was not even
the consequence of foreign exchange speculation) and small in size, contributed to worsen
Table 7. Foreign currency dealings as percentage of total ordinary income.a
1970 1971 1972 1973
4% 15% 9% 57%
aBAK, B 126/59464, der Bundesminister der Finanzen an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Antwort der
Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Katzer, Mick, Dr Mu¨ller-Hermann, Nordlohne,
Dr Hornhues, Ey, Eilers (Wilhelmshaven), Breidbach, Mu¨ller (Remscheid) und Genossen – Drucksache 7/24 38,
Betr.: Zusammenbruch des Bankhauses I.D. Herstatt KG a.A., 28 August 1974.
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the atmosphere.93 Swiss and US bankers expressed concern regarding the effects of the
Herstatt collapse on the international payments system.94 Herstatt’s collapse also affected
international financial transactions, causing an increase in the Eurodollar market interest
rates as smaller banks in particular found it impossible to borrow on the market. Banks
became more cautious, and privileged dealing with big familiar ones.95
New York creditors were far more affected than London banks (Table 8). Chase
Manhattan Bank in New York was caught with about $620m of transfers due to customers
on account of Herstatt.96 Among more than 30 banks, claimants to the account included
Morgan Guarantee ($13m), a Swiss subsidiary of Seattle-First ($42.5m), Hesse-Newman
of Germany ($39.7m), Citibank ($10m), Svenska Handelsbanken ($7m). About 3000
creditors made claims on Herstatt.
In particular, one unintended consequence of the Herstatt collapse was to put the IBB
into trouble, and thereby add a further example of cross-national banking that posed
important international regulatory challenges.97 Part of the solutions envisaged to avoid
another Herstatt-like failure were domestic in nature, and concerned the creation of the
Liquidity Consortium Bank, or Liko-Bank, jointly owned by the Bundesbank and the
banking industry. It was designed to provide liquidity on a short-term basis to institutions
that were otherwise financially sound banks.98 In addition, following these crises, the
Bundesbank ‘has introduced a reporting requirement for forward exchange obligations of
German banks. The reporting requirement will cover about 400 domestic banks including
German branches of foreign banks which already have to report their foreign short-term
assets and liabilities. The banks will have to report forward foreign exchange contracts
with maturities of less than one month, one to three months, and more than three months.
The volume of transactions will have to be reported in deutschemarks with dollar and
sterling transactions to be reported separately.’99
As the previous sections made plain, the question of an effective early identification of
problems with a bank’s operations is at the heart of the regulatory process. It was certainly
difficult for BAKred and the Bundesbank to adequately react to rumours saying that
Bankhaus Herstatt was overtrading, and it was equally difficult for them to know what was
going on in its Luxembourg subsidiary. The German authorities failed to detect and
prevent Herstatt’s collapse, and this collapse had important cross-border implications, so
the issue became discussed internationally. The creation of the cross-national BCBS was
aimed at ensuring that there were no gaps in prudential supervision and to design an ‘early
warning system’ should another Herstatt-type failure threaten systemic stability. The
contribution of the Herstatt episode was to alert supervisors to the danger that a failure of a
relatively minor and mainly national bank could have systemic effects on confidence in
international banking markets.100 However, the suggestion of an ‘early warning system’
was quickly dismissed, and the BCBS reverted instead to the sharing of rumours. Given
Table 8. Losses of London banks to Herstatt (USD million).a
Williams and Glyns $9m deposit
Chase Manhattan $5m swap
Moscow Norodny $365m swaps
Union Bank of Switzerland $25m swap
Hill Samuel $21m swap
United Bank of Kuwait $190m swap
First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee $10m swap
Antony Gibbs $1.25m swap
aBoE, 349A/2 Memo JLS 27 June 1974 and 29 July 1974.
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how effective the sharing of rumours had been in the Herstatt example, this was certainly
not promising future effective international regulation and supervision.
5. Conclusions
Paradoxically, it is not what came to be known as the ‘Herstatt Risk’ that brought down the
Herstatt bank – it was rather one of its consequences. This article has however shown,
through a detailed reconstruction of events, that the Herstatt risk – the risk of dealing
across different time zones – partly amounts to a pure chance outcome. Had the 26 June
meeting started in a timely fashion, thanks to no flight delays nor traffic jams, then perhaps
the closure of the bank would have happened prior to the start of the business day on the
other side of the Atlantic, and thereby might have considerably reduced (if not completely
removed) the international implications of the bank’s closure. The Herstatt risk might thus
have come out in the open later, on another occasion, and under a different name. It is also
noticeable that the German authorities explicitly mentioned the possibility of closing
down Herstatt throughout the last 24 hours preceding its actual closure. There was
therefore little surprise in the eventual outcome of the three day long negotiations over the
future of the bank, although it seems that the German regulators and supervisors had little
understanding of the international consequences this decision would precipitate.
This in-depth study of the Bankhaus-Herstatt collapse highlights the perennial
competition between the supervisor and the supervised, the regulators and the regulated.
It reveals that in spite of credible rumours about Herstatt’s over-trading, neither the
Bundesaufsichtsamt fu¨r das Kreditwesen nor the Bundesbank managed to take necessary
measures to prevent the Cologne bank from continuing in its errors. And once the German
authorities decided to act, in early 1974, it was arguably too little too late to save Herstatt.
The reasons for the Herstatt debacle did not amount to regulatory capture, understood
as a control of regulation by those regulated.101 At no point has the Herstatt bank and
whoever worked for it been in a position to influence the regulatory policymaking process,
nor was able to use government regulation to serve the interests of the bank. If one may
consider that some people at Herstatt managed to fool the German supervisors, this cannot
amount to regulatory capture. ‘Capture implies conflict,’ as Posner writes,102 and there has
been no conflict at any stage in the Herstatt story. The Herstatt debacle amounts rather to a
combination of poor oversight performance on the part of the German authorities,
irregularities in the bank’s foreign exchange operations as well as significant information
asymmetries that led a number of banks to keep dealing with Herstatt while others knew of
the bank’s unenviable reputation, and therefore refrained from dealing with it. These three
factors combined to an unfortunate delay in the start of the last critical meeting led to a
much delayed action by the German authorities, and hence of financial consequences
much greater than they could otherwise have been given the relatively small size of
Bankhaus Herstatt.
The reaction of the German supervisory authorities also interestingly foreshadows that
of the Bank of England following the Lloyds Lugano scandal.103 In 1974, Marc Colombo,
a Swiss trader in the Lugano branch of Lloyds Bank International (LBI), hid his losses in
the foreign exchange market. This posed a regulatory problem, as it was not clear who was
responsible for the supervision of the Lugano branch: the Bank of England (since it was
LBI) or the Swiss authorities? Discussion about supervision and regulation of overseas
branches in Threadneedle Street prompted the Bank of England to draft a letter of
guidance for banks to control their overseas branches. If the context was certainly different
(the Lugano debacle asked the question of the supervision of overseas branches of UK
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banks) the issue was similar (foreign exchange trading) and the supervisory outcome quite
close (the supervisor issues a warning letter reaching commercial banks). In both
instances, the Bank of England and BAKred wrote an unbinding letter of intentions and
counted on moral suasion. Where the two responses importantly differed was in their
timing: the Bank of England wrote its warning letter after the Lugano debacle, while the
Bundesaufsichtsamt sent its message before the Herstatt collapse. In spite of its
importance however, the collapse of Herstatt did not spur, in the end, the creation of a
more effective system of international regulation and supervision. The BCBS instead
focused on the sharing of gossip, which had been largely ineffective in preventing
Herstatt’s collapse, and shifted its attention to filling gaps in international supervision, as
highlighted by the Lloyds and IBB debacles.
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